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ABSTRACT—Conceptions of property exist on a spectrum between the 
Blackstonian absolute dominion over an object to a bundle of rights and 
obligations that recognizes, if not encourages, the splitting of property 
interests among different people. The development of the bundle of rights 
conception of property occurred in roughly the same era as the enactment 
of the modern federal income tax. Nevertheless, when Congress enacted 
the tax in 1913, it did not consider how the nuances of property, and the 
possible splitting of the property interests in an income-producing item, 
might affect application of the tax. Soon after the tax’s enactment, the 
Treasury Department and the courts were confronted with questions of who 
owned, and could be taxed on, what income. As shown by an examination 
of family partnerships and synthetic leases, the government continues to 
struggle with determining who owns a sufficient property interest to be 
taxed because Congress has yet to define ownership for tax purposes. 
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I. FROM BLACKSTONE TO BUNDLES 
Sir William Blackstone made famous the conception of property as 
“that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over 
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.”1 This vision of property attributes to the owner 
almost total control. Despite the resonance of this Blackstonian ideal, truly 
despotic ownership over property has never been possible. Society 
demands constraints on what owners are allowed to do with their property; 
and many owners sell or give away some, but not all, rights to their 
property. Today Blackstone’s view of property as a solitary thing—owned 
and controlled by one—is a fiction, although one that continues to have 
political power. Instead, we divide some attributes of ownership here, we 
limit some rights there, each of these responses to modern life flying in the 
face of our Blackstonian conception of property. 
If Blackstone could impose his view of property on the United States 
today, the income tax could be easily and fairly applied. Whoever owned a 
piece of property, and only one person could, would be taxed on the 
income that the property produced. Property owners’ ability to convey 
away limited rights to property complicates this story. Congress did not 
consider this complication when it drafted the 1913 income tax, 
notwithstanding growing understanding in many quarters that property was 
a “bundle of rights.”2 In roughly the same period as the modern income 
tax’s enactment, policymakers began to realize that different people could 
have different rights to portions of property. Nevertheless, Congress 
imposed on the tax a conception of property consistent with the earlier 
Blackstonian vision. 
 
1 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
2 The metaphor has been traced to the late nineteenth century. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, 
COMMODITY & PROPRIETY 322 n.40 (1997). The term was not used by Wesley Hohfeld who is often 
credited with this conception of property. See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental 
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). 
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Property as an abstract compilation of different types of rights could 
be, and often was, owned by different people. To the extent that property 
was owned by more than one person, whether what a person owned was 
appropriate to be taxed was open to debate. Despite this issue, Congress 
originally ignored the potential complexity of ownership when it taxed the 
income “of” an individual.3 That phrasing presupposed Blackstone’s 
understanding of ownership, and for a significant period of time no one felt 
the need to determine ownership for tax purposes.4 That this fundamental 
issue was ignored might not be surprising in the world of congressional 
politics when income tax rates were low and the amount of revenue it 
raised was small compared to the other federal taxes. Nevertheless, the 
failure of Congress to grapple head-on with this issue of taxation in the 
midst of an evolving understanding of ownership has resulted in legal 
confusion and costly litigation over the application of the federal income 
tax. 
Soon after the 1913 income tax’s enactment, the Treasury Department 
was confronted with numerous tax returns, the tax liability of which turned 
on the ownership of property. In the early decades of the income tax, the 
potential to fracture ownership was contested most often with respect to 
family property (as many of the business arrangements and financial 
products that currently utilize complex ownership structures were not yet 
imagined). Partnerships, trusts, contracts, community property laws, all 
provided the opportunity for interested parties to argue about who owned 
what and what ownership meant. Although ownership evoked 
consideration of power and control, dispersing ownership, if only for tax 
purposes, allowed families as a collective to have more income taxed in 
lower tax brackets, thereby encouraging the fracturing of ownership as a 
means of tax reduction. In the face of these contests, the question arose 
whether the federal government would develop a federal common law of 
ownership for income tax purposes to answer the question of who should 
be taxed on what. 
This Article progresses in three parts. First, this Article briefly 
discusses the political and judicial history of the income tax. The 
antecedent to the modern income tax was enacted in 1913, at the height of 
the Progressive Era. In a time of reform and dreams of reform, Congress 
passed an income tax based on the idea of a redistributive tax but without a 
plan for how the tax would actually work.5 The rhetoric of class legislation 
and redistributing from the rich to the poor that permeated earlier debates 
over the income tax was common to Progressive Era politics. Since there 
 
3 See Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81. 
4 Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1396, 1400–01 
(1975). 
5 Stephanie Hunter McMahon, A Law with a Life of Its Own: The Development of the Federal 
Income Tax Statutes Through World War I, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
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was an established focus on the income tax as class legislation, that focus 
allowed Congress to either miss or ignore the importance of the ownership 
question. Second, this Article discusses the evolution in the Progressive Era 
of the idea of ownership and the expansiveness of property interests. 
Although Congress was not focused on this issue when it enacted the 1913 
income tax, the ensuing complications in the development of this legal 
concept nevertheless shaped what the income tax would become. 
Developments in legal theory independent of taxation provided the 
arguments necessary for taxpayers to minimize their taxes. It appears that 
Congress did not anticipate this cross-pollination of ideas between the law 
of property and taxation. 
Finally, examining first family partnerships and then synthetic leases, 
this Article evaluates the consequences of Congress’s position (or lack 
thereof) on the meaning of ownership. In each, the government’s desire to 
apply the tax consistently on a national level required it to define 
ownership broadly, not only as legal title but also, at times, as control or 
beneficial enjoyment. Moreover, acknowledgement that something was 
owned was sometimes dismissed because of the focus on how or why the 
interest was created. With respect to family partnerships, the Supreme 
Court often focused on the creation of the partnership and whether its 
creation was valid rather than examining the rights purported partners had 
in the partnership. The result was less deference to state partnership law, 
but this lack of deference risked creating situations where state law owners 
were not taxed on their property interests’ income. For synthetic leases, the 
Treasury Department focuses on the benefits and burdens created by these 
transactions as opposed to following legal title. The results are that the 
transactions produce favorable tax results with corresponding favorable, 
but different, results for financial accounting purposes. 
Thus, although “ownership of income and property is the lodestar” of 
taxation, it contains its own ambiguities.6 This Article’s examination of this 
issue does not mean that a definitive rule for determining ownership can or 
will be found. As a nation, we have not yet defined what it means to own 
something. Therefore, it may be too much to expect Congress to define it in 
a satisfactory way for federal tax purposes. Nevertheless, the Article’s 
lesson should caution against creating an income tax regime that assumes 
ownership is understood and quantifiable. 
II. HISTORY OF THE INCOME TAX 
Scholars debate the causes for the United States’ ratification of the 
Sixteenth Amendment and its enactment of the modern income tax. Sidney 
 
6 Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not Marriage as the Basis of Family Taxation, 
86 IND. L.J. 1459, 1462 (2011). Ventry notes the Court’s imposition of an “expansive definition of 
ownership” for tax purposes. Id. at 1464. 
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Ratner portrays a progressive struggle between the forces of societal justice 
and those protecting private gain.7 Robert Stanley, on the other hand, 
argues that the tax reflects a statist attempt to prevent real economic 
redistribution; therefore, the enactment of the mild income tax was no more 
than the guileful use of political rhetoric.8 A stronger neoconservative 
interpretation by Robert Higgs argues the income tax was an opportunity 
for interest groups to gain for themselves through the redistribution of 
income and special funding.9 Finally, W. Elliot Brownlee takes what he 
terms a “democratic institutionalist” perspective, arguing the progressive 
income tax reflected developing ideas and values but was limited by 
institutional restrictions in the final shaping of the income tax.10 Each 
theory examines the ideas that policymakers and the public discussed at the 
time of the enactment of the 1913 income tax, and each theory underscores 
that few cared about the details of the income tax’s operation. 
The income tax, a tax that currently wields tremendous political and 
economic power, was initially adopted more for rhetorical than 
redistributive goals.11 The Congressional Record reflects the income tax’s 
relative insignificance to Congress in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when debates over the tax were repeatedly abandoned in favor of 
discussion of more pressing tax issues, namely tariffs.12 The debates on the 
income tax that did occur centered most often on the tax’s class-based 
elements. The question of redistribution, and whether this was a 
permissible objective for Congress, meant that operational issues of the 
new income tax were given short shrift. Thus opportunities for debating, 
and perhaps resolving, issues of ownership and property as they would 
arise under the income tax were missed. Similarly, the two previous times 
Congress had enacted an income tax provided little evidence of how the tax 
actually worked when it was challenged. For example, the Civil War 
individual income tax, as a war measure, faced fewer challenges than the 
modern tax. Only two cases reached the Supreme Court in the eleven years 
between its enactment and repeal, whether for reasons of patriotic 
taxpaying or for want of enforcement.13 On the other hand, in the same time 
 
7 SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 298–340 (1967); see also RANDOLPH 
E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 77–104 (1954). 
8 ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER 13 (1993). 
9 ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 112–13 (1987); see also Ben Baack & Edward John Ray, The Political Economy of the 
Origin and Development of the Federal Income Tax, in EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 121, 135 (Robert Higgs ed., 1985). 
10 W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 265–68 (2d ed. 2004). 
11 McMahon, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
12 Id. at 10–11, 16–17, 21–22. 
13 See Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63 (1872) (evaluating the ability to tax gain on the 
sale of U.S. bonds); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870) (assessing the ability to tax 
members of state governments). 
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frame after enactment of the 1913 income tax, almost forty cases reached 
the highest Court.14 Taxpayers challenged the earlier income tax less 
frequently, putting less pressure on defining the details of the tax. 
When Congress enacted the income tax first during the Civil War, and 
then again during a major depression, it regarded these small revenue 
raisers as ancillary components of larger revenue bills.15 These early 
income taxes crystalized the debate regarding the tax’s class-based 
features. The continuing debate of this issue meant the focus remained on 
the justification for the tax itself. For example, during the Civil War, 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Justin Morrill, who 
otherwise argued Congress would have to accept the income tax even if it 
was the “least defensible” part of the revenue bill, questioned: “Ought not 
men, too, with large incomes to pay more in proportion to what they have 
than those with limited means, who live by the work of their own hands or 
that of their families?”16 Supporters of the Civil War income tax portrayed 
it as a balance to the otherwise regressive national tax regime: 
We tax the tea, the coffee, the sugar, the spices the poor man uses. We tax 
every little thing that is imported from abroad, together with the whisky that 
makes him drunk and the beer that cheers him and the tobacco that consoles 
him. Everything that he consumes we call a luxury and tax it; and yet we are 
afraid to touch the income of Mr. Astor. Is there any justice in that?17 
Opponents focused on perceived inequity in the income tax itself. 
Thaddeus Stevens argued, “It seems to me that it is a strange way to punish 
men because they are rich.”18 
Thereafter, reformers proposed the income tax intermittently to fund 
new programs and to demonstrate—both to reform’s friends and foes 
alike—a desire for change.19 With the focus on reforming the fiscal 
program, the class-based debates continued. At the time of the enactment of 
the second income tax during the Panic of 1893, when many believed that 
money, monopoly, and the concentration of wealth threatened the 
foundation of democracy, a limited income tax was viewed as “a check that 
 
14 See, e.g., Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920) (denying ability to tax federal judges); S. Pac. Co. 
v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918) (denying ability to tax income earned prior to enactment of the tax); 
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918) (denying stock dividend is taxable income); Brushaber v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (denying shareholder the ability to restrain corporation from complying 
with the tax). 
15 McMahon, supra note 5, at 10–11, 16–17, 21–22. This is not to dismiss earlier theoretical work 
regarding the equity of an income tax but to highlight the sparseness of intelligence on the working of 
such a tax. 
16 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1196 (1862); See also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1876, 2513–14 (1864) (additional statements regarding class-based taxation). 
17 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 4715 (1870) (statement of Roger Sherman). 
18 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1876 (1864). 
19 See, e.g., HARRY EDWIN SMITH, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM 
1861 TO 1871, at 74–75 (1914); see also HIGGS, supra note 9, at 97. 
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will measurably stop these vast accumulations.”20 The focus, however, was 
not always on the tax’s impact on the wealthy. One critic complained, “I 
oppose this bill because I will not consent by any act of mine to place the 
humblest or the poorest of my fellow-citizens on a political plane one shade 
lower than that occupied by the richest and the proudest.”21 
The Supreme Court’s invalidation of the 1894 income tax a scant five 
months after the tax’s enactment demonstrated the Court’s focus on the 
class-based features of the tax.22 Although the Court’s holding in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. was narrow, in dicta the majority took a 
broader and more hostile view toward income taxation, arguing that 
“[n]othing can be clearer than that what the Constitution intended to guard 
against was the exercise by the general government of the power of directly 
taxing persons and property within any State through a majority made up 
from the other States.”23 Justice Stephen Field opined, “The present assault 
upon capital is but the beginning. It will be but the stepping-stone to others, 
larger and more sweeping, till our political contests will become a war of 
the poor against the rich . . . .”24 The dissents of Justices Edward Douglass 
White and John Marshall Harlan characterized the majority as a self-
conscious, economic class acting in its own interests.25 
With the new century and the rise of progressivism, people 
increasingly questioned economic divisions within the nation and searched 
for ways to reduce them. In the 1908 presidential election, both Democrats 
and Republicans supported some version of a federal income tax.26 Some 
supporters advocated “an income tax not as a temporary measure for the 
purpose of securing revenue for temporary purposes, but because we 
believe it should be a permanent part and portion of the revenue system of 
the United States.”27 No longer was the income tax seen solely as a revenue 
stopgap, but it was seen by some at least as a viable long-term method of 
inserting the federal government into the national economy.28 However, this 
 
20 26 CONG. REC. 1730 (1894) (statement of Joseph Sibley); see GERALD T. WHITE, THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE PROBLEM OF RECOVERY AFTER 1893 (1982) (not even mentioning the income tax); 
see also HIGGS, supra note 9, at 79–97. 
21 26 CONG. REC. app. 465 (1894) (statement of William Bourke Cockran). 
22 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I), 157 U.S. 429, 583, modified on reh’g, 158 
U.S. 601 (1895). 
23 Id. at 582. 
24 Id. at 607 (opinion of Field, J.). 
25 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock II), 158 U.S. 601, 671–75 (1985) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); id. at 712–13 (White, J., dissenting). 
26 Paolo E. Coletta, Election of 1908, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 841, 
866 (Gil Troy et al. eds., 4th ed. 2012). 
27 44 CONG. REC. 1680 (1909) (statement of Sen. Borah); see also William E. Borah, Income-Tax 
Amendment, 191 N. AM. REV. 755, 755–61 (1910) (urging adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment). 
28 STANLEY, supra note 8, at 195–98. 
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proposal failed to win sufficient support in Congress until passage of a 
constitutional amendment. 
By the 1912 presidential election, with ratification of the Sixteenth 
Amendment still uncertain, the progressive movement peaked.29 Coming to 
power after the extravagance of the Gilded Age, Progressives and radical 
Democrats openly opposed big business and increasingly targeted the 
concentration of wealth and power. As part of this policy change, the 
Progressive Era witnessed a paradigmatic shift to recognizing a need to 
fund government based on taxpayers’ ability to pay. The income tax was a 
necessary component of this new system. Although President Woodrow 
Wilson urged moderation,30 in his 1913 inaugural address he also called for 
tariff reform, a hot political topic.31 Many expected Wilson to use the 
income tax to make up revenues lost from this reform.32 Then, after the 
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Wilson called a special 
congressional session, and the House Ways and Means Committee reported 
a bill less than a week later.33 
In developing their ideas on taxation, Progressive Era politicians 
looked to economists and political theorists who were working through the 
ideas of the income tax.34 New tax policies advocated by this first 
generation of professionally trained academics focused on the “mutual 
interdependence of modern social relations.”35 Commentators, such as 
Edwin R.A. Seligman, softened the rhetoric used to describe the benefits 
and burdens of the tax, and the tax came to be perceived as a respectable 
revenue measure.36 “The history of finance . . . shows the evolution of the 
principle of faculty or ability to pay—the principle that each individual 
should be held to help the state in proportion to his ability to help 
himself.”37 Despite the evolution in the supporting arguments for the tax, 
many practical issues were left open. Seligman, for example, questioned 
 
29 George E. Mowry, Election of 1912, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 
supra note 26, at 877, 877. 
30 Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Furnifold M. Simmons (Sept. 4, 1913), in 28 THE PAPERS OF 
WOODROW WILSON 254, 254 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1978). 
31 H.R. DOC. NO. 63-1, at 3–5 (1913) (address by President Wilson to a joint session of Congress); 
see also S. DOC. NO. 63-3, at 3–6 (1913) (inaugural address of President Wilson). 
32 See, e.g., Cuts Message Short, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1913, at 4; Holland’s Letter, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 7, 1913, at 1. 
33 H.R. DOC. NO. 63-1, at 3–5 (1913) (President Wilson’s address to Congress); accord H.R. 10 
(1913) (bill reported by the House Committee). 
34 Ajay K. Mehrotra, Envisioning the Modern American Fiscal State: Progressive-Era Economists 
and the Intellectual Foundations of the U.S. Income Tax, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2005); M. 
Susan Murnane, Selling Scientific Taxation: The Treasury Department’s Campaign for Tax Reform in 
the 1920s, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 819, 824 (2004). 
35 Mehrotra, supra note 34, at 1811. 
36 Compare EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 631–73 (2d ed. 1914), with Edwin R.A. 
Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 220, 244–51 (1893). 
37 SELIGMAN, INCOME TAX, supra note 36, at 4. 
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what constituted income in the new tax and whether all sources of income 
should be treated equally.38 Because the debate was framed as an attack on 
earlier forms of taxation, it remained a political science and economics 
issue instead of also being a legal one that should involve those interested 
in questions of property. 
There was no opposition voiced to the income tax in the House; the 
strongest opinions attempted either to raise or lower the exemption level.39 
Likewise in the Senate, where there was a smaller but more radical 
Democratic majority, there was relatively little debate. Republicans 
generally ignored the income tax.40 The tax that was enacted imposed a 
graduated tax on individual incomes above a $3000 exemption for 
individuals and a $4000 exemption for married couples.41 These 
exemptions were high when the mean adult male income was only $578.42 
The tax rate was 1% on all taxable income after deductions and the 
exemption. An additional surtax ranged from 1% to 6% on amounts in 
excess of $20,000. The highest combined rate was 7% on incomes above 
$500,000.43 This income tax was less progressive and less ambitious than 
the Civil War legislation, and it gave little hint that the income tax would 
become the dominant source of federal revenue.44 
Notwithstanding the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, public 
sentiment was never solidly in support of a federal income tax, possibly 
because of its limited impact.45 At first the revenue generated by the income 
tax was minimal, yielding only $71 million, or 9.7% of the federal 
government’s ordinary revenue, in 1914.46 In 1913, only 1.5% of all 
households paid federal income taxes, and only 2% of the labor force paid 
income taxes each year from 1913 through 1915.47 The yield grew but 
remained relatively low until World War I limited other sources of revenue, 
forcing Congress to increase income tax rates and lower its exemptions.48 
 
38 See id. at 16 (considering ability to pay). 
39 See, e.g., 50 CONG. REC. 1252, 1254–55, 3851–52 (1913) (remarks of Rep. Murray (D–OK), 
Rep. Britten (R–IL), Rep. Bristow (R–KS), and Rep. Williams (D–MS)). 
40 50 CONG. REC. 3839–40 (1913) (not entering the debate). 
41 Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 168. 
42 STANLEY, supra note 8, at 249. 
43 § 2, 38 Stat. at 166. 
44 See Joseph A. Hill, The Income Tax of 1913, 28 Q.J. ECON. 46 (1913), for a discussion written at 
the time. 
45 STANLEY, supra note 8, at 225–26; see also The Income-Tax Amendment, 46 LITERARY DIG. 
325, 326 (1913); The Income-Tax Plan, 46 LITERARY DIG. 877, 877–78 (1913); The Income Tax Under 
Fire, 46 LITERARY DIG. 1163, 1163–64 (1913). 
46 STANLEY, supra note 8, at 227. 
47 W. Elliot Brownlee, Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy Toward the Rich, in DOES ATLAS 
SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 29, 41–42 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000). 
48 For a discussion of World War I financing, see CHARLES GILBERT, AMERICAN FINANCING OF 
WORLD WAR I 75–116 (1970); W. Elliot Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The 
Revenue Act of 1916, 129 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC. 173, 191 (1985); Ajay K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns, 
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A $177 million budget deficit—rather than concerns for the equity of 
the tax system’s operation—caused Congress to push down personal 
exemption levels and raise income tax rates during World War I.49 More 
than $1 billion was raised by the federal income tax, with exemptions 
reduced from $4000 for heads of families and $3000 for single individuals 
to $2000 and $1000 respectively, and top rates raised to 67% in 1917 and 
77% in 1918.50 Those shouldering the burden of this much stiffer income 
tax were only a small percentage of the population. In 1918, approximately 
15% of American families had to pay some amount of personal income tax, 
but the wealthiest 1% paid 80% of the revenues raised.51 The average 
effective rates for this elite group increased from 3% in 1916 to 15% in 
1918.52 
Despite ensuing tax cuts, the nation did not bounce back from the war 
by reducing taxes to prewar levels.53 Scholars have shown that, although 
income tax rates were reduced in the 1920s, World War I permanently 
changed the federal tax system. By the 1920s, many in the Treasury 
Department were pushing what they viewed as scientific taxation, and their 
policy did not entail elimination of the income tax.54 Not accepting 
scientific claims behind tax policy, economist Thomas S. Adams opined, 
“In taxation . . . let me make the deals and I care not who makes the 
ideals.”55 One of the greatest of the early American tax experts, Adams had 
no illusions about altruistic or even equitable principles driving the tax law. 
Rather, he saw policymaking as a “group contest in which powerful 
interests vigorously endeavor to rid themselves of present or proposed tax 
burdens.”56 In Adams’s view, these interest groups divided largely on 
economic or class lines, leading him to conclude that “[c]lass politics is of 
the essence of taxation.”57 
 
and Public Moneys: The U.S. Treasury, World War I, and the Administration of the Modern Fiscal 
State, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 173, 181 (2010). 
49 President Wilson and leading members of the Democratic Party did attack concentrations of 
wealth, although primarily wealth held in corporate form, in order to finance government spending on 
the War on the basis of highly progressive taxation. ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 48–50 (1940); BROWNLEE, supra note 10, at 60–63. 
50 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, Pub. L. No. 65-254, §§ 210–211, 216, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062–64, 
1069 (1919). 
51 BROWNLEE, supra note 10, at 63. 
52 Id. 
53 Anne Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the Twenties: The 1924 
Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373, 374 (2006). 
54 Thomas S. Adams, Fundamental Problems of Federal Income Taxation, 35 Q.J. ECON. 527, 
537–40 (1921); Murnane, supra note 34. 
55 T.S. Adams, Ideals and Idealism in Taxation, 18 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1928). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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Although issues of redistribution still pervaded debates, people were 
increasingly aware of implementation issues, including questions of who 
should be taxed on particular items of income.58 After complaining that the 
Internal Revenue Code did not define property, one practitioner concluded, 
“It would do well enough for a primitive civilization, . . . but it does not 
suffice under our complex doctrines of successive estates and interests 
splitting up the absolute ownership of property.”59 Property held in trust or 
on a chain of legal limitations was recognized to change in value, and the 
question remained what should be taxed and at what valuation.60 Some 
problems took a while to be recognized in their entirety. For example, only 
once the Supreme Court conclusively ruled in 1921 that the appreciation of 
capital assets must be included in income could the issue of who should be 
taxed on the realization of future interests be assessed.61 
How the federal government would respond to tax planning based on 
splitting the ownership of property among various taxpayers was not 
foreordained. As discussed in Part IV below, in cases involving taxpayers 
and their returns that made their way to the highest court, the Supreme 
Court went back and forth between federal and state law to give substance 
to the federal tax as it sought to determine ownership. The Supreme Court 
began by imposing a Blackstonian sense of ownership. However, as the old 
Blackstonian theory of ownership lost ground as the governing theory of 
property, the Court began to recognize that it must alter its approach to 
these questions. Thus, despite a consistent reference to ownership, how the 
courts interpreted ownership changed over time and in different contexts, 
and it remains an undefined term. The focus on different indicia of 
ownership (whether title, benefit, or control) highlights the evolving, and 
ultimately uncertain, meaning of ownership within income taxation. 
Attempting to characterize ownership as a simple rule minimizes the 
difficult choices that necessarily arise when applying the concept. This 
recognition continues to have consequences in everything from family 
transfers of property to complex financial products. In other words, 
ownership remains a complicated concept for the income tax. 
III. EVOLVING SENSE OF PROPERTY 
Conceptions of property can be placed on a spectrum between, on one 
hand, the Blackstonian asset model and, on the other, a bundle of rights and 
 
58 See, e.g., Adams, Fundamental Problems, supra note 54; Alexander M. Hamburg, Exemption of 
State and Municipal Securities from Federal Income Taxation, 7 VA. L. REV. 195, 198–200 (1921); 
John M. Maguire, Income Taxes on the Realization of Future Interests, 31 YALE L.J. 367, 369–72 
(1921); Edward Rightor, Are Inheritance Taxes Deductible?, 2 LOY. L. REV. 20, 20–22 (1921); Arthur 
L. Corbin, Comment, Taxation of Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429, 429 (1921). 
59 Maguire, supra note 58, at 373. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 367. 
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obligations. These two paradigms reflect different understandings of what 
property is and what property provides to its owner.62 The Blackstonian 
view envisions an owner who has almost total power over his or her 
property. Conversely, focusing less on the thing itself, the bundle theory 
emphasizes the interrelationships among societal actors and the property 
plus the rights and obligations that property creates for its owners. 
Accepting that property is a bundle of rights means that not only is the 
owner’s relation to the property at issue but, more importantly, the owner’s 
relation to other stakeholders is at issue. 
Although this Article opened with Blackstone’s broad definition of 
ownership, any attachment to that view was relatively short lived in the 
United States. The push against this monolithic notion of property began in 
the nineteenth century in order to facilitate that century’s economic 
growth.63 In a capital-scarce society, there was a need for the judicial 
philosophies underpinning property rights to encourage economic 
development. Post-Civil War growth only spurred the developing meaning 
of property. Morton Horwitz once explained, “The basic problem of legal 
thinkers after the Civil War was how to articulate a conception of property 
that could accommodate the tremendous expansion in the variety of forms 
of ownership spawned by a dynamic industrial society.”64 
Despite economic development pushing the concept of property to 
accommodate new ownership forms, the change was not instantaneous. The 
concept of property evolved over the nineteenth century from a physical 
entity to something that was more abstract and relative.65 This was, at first, 
a minority opinion. Justice Noah Swayne dissented in 1872 that “[p]roperty 
is everything which has an exchangeable value.”66 By 1890, in the first 
Minnesota Rate Case, the Supreme Court had accepted that property was 
the exchange value of anything.67 The de-physicalization of property in the 
rate cases produced radical changes in the law of property because these 
cases forced judges to explain abstract notions of property.68 In Smyth v. 
Ames, for example, the Court struggled to define the value of the railroad’s 
property interest in its transit runs—the actual trips that it took over its 
 
62 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 70–71 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
63 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 31–34 (1977); 
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern 
Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 328–30 (1980). 
64 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 145 (1992). 
65 Id. 
66 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 127 (1872) (Swayne, J., dissenting). 
67 See Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 458–59 (1890) (Miller, J., 
concurring). 
68 Stephen Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad 
and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187, 193 (1984). 
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rails.69 Although Smyth became a subject of controversy among economists 
by the 1920s regarding the appropriate valuation of the new property, that it 
was property was no longer in doubt.70 
The conception of property as a bundle of abstract rights was further 
developed when the government made expansive use of its eminent domain 
power to take property to aid economic development. It was in the 
evolution of the jurisprudence of eminent domain that property first 
developed into a bundle of rights.71 In the prior century, judges focused on 
compensated versus inconsequential damages when they policed the taking 
of property. As the law evolved beyond the idea of physical property, and 
value became increasingly concentrated in commercial and intangible 
property rights, theorists attempted to redefine the “taking” involved in 
eminent domain cases away from the idea of a physical invasion of space 
toward the reduction of market value.72 Market value had become one stick 
in the bundle that was property. As a result of the pressure brought to bear 
by eminent domain, one treatise claimed in 1888, “The dullest individual 
among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a 
bundle of rights.”73 
Although property has since lost ground in the popular imagination to 
other legal issues, such as free speech and the right to bear arms, 
throughout the early period of the income tax, property was a central value 
in American legal thought.74 It was in the Progressive Era that scholars 
recognized the bundle concept as a means of reconciling the competing 
needs of property. Individuals and the government wanted property to 
mean much more than the Blackstonian conception allowed. Property 
rights were no longer merely a negative right to exclude others but included 
some degree of obligation to others. 
These new demands clouded the meaning of property as legal theorists 
worked through the conception of property to accommodate Progressive 
and, later, Realist reforms. Wesley N. Hohfeld noted that: 
Both with lawyers and with laymen this term [property] has no definite or 
stable connotation. Sometimes it is employed to indicate the physical object to 
which various legal rights, privileges, etc., relate; then again—with far greater 
discrimination and accuracy—the word is used to denote the legal interest (or 
aggregate of legal relations) appertaining to such physical object.75 
 
69 169 U.S. 466, 517–22 (1898). 
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71 HORWITZ, 1870–1960, supra note 64, at 146–48. 
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Hohfeld recognized a need to define various legal interests and 
relations in property through the creation of a schema for analyzing what 
makes up these legal conceptions.76 Hohfeld pushed a “radical 
reconstruction” of American society and, in the process, analyzed property 
in furtherance of society’s “underlying policies and purposes” in a manner 
that made popular the bundle of rights conception.77 
As a result of Hohfeld’s work, Arthur L. Corbin stated in 1922, “Our 
concept of property has shifted; . . . property has ceased to describe any res, 
or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal 
relations—rights, powers, privileges, immunities.”78 For these early 
Realists, the bundle of rights was malleable so that sticks of the bundle 
could be adjusted and rearranged to fit the needs of the day.79 To the extent 
the sticks described infinitely variable relations between people and there 
was no requirement of what must be in the bundle itself, policy concerns 
were expected to drive changes to the notion of property itself. 
These radical ideas were developing in the era of the 1913 income tax 
and yet the tax did not acknowledge these evolving issues.80 Instead, tax 
policymakers focused more on the issues proposed by other academic 
leaders.81 For example, Robert L. Hale argued, also in 1922, that 
“[o]wnership is an indirect method whereby the government coerces some 
to yield an income to the owners. When the law turns around and curtails 
the incomes of property owners, it is in substance curtailing the salaries of 
public officials or pensioners.”82 According to Hale, if property law 
strongly limits others’ ability to use one’s property by broadly construing 
property rights and punishing infringements, the owner may demand high 
prices for the use of his property; if the limits imposed by property law are 
light, his prices must be low.83 Under this view, property was a form of 
theft; ownership of its income rested on legal rights, and, therefore, this 
ownership could be altered at any time.84 Taxation of income, so Hale 
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77 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Professor of Law, Yale Univ., Address Before the 
Association of American Law Schools: A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American 
Universities Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day? (Dec. 
28, 1914). 
78 Corbin, supra note 58 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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argued, should redistribute income from the rich to the poor to correct the 
theft that was property.85 Hale’s discussion of property was more consistent 
with the class-based arguments surrounding the income tax, rather than the 
more nuanced ideas of Hohfeld. 
Over fifty years after Corbin and Hale weighed in on property, long 
after the enactment of the income tax in 1913, Thomas Grey proclaimed the 
“disintegration” of property and the completion of the “substitution of a 
bundle-of-rights for thing–ownership conception of property.”86 Realists 
continued in their desire to use the evolving notions of property rights to 
mitigate the harms created by prior economic development. Grey argued 
the disintegration of property was “intrinsic to the development of a free-
market economy into an industrial phase.”87 The dissolution of the 
traditional concept of property could be said to have eroded the moral basis 
of capitalism because, to the extent property was not an absolute right, 
redistribution from rich to poor might no longer be objectionable.88 If the 
state was no longer a neutral enforcer of the private relations of ownership 
and contract, but had become a player that uses collective force on behalf 
of haves and have-nots, the use of complex property ideas would allow 
peaceful redistribution.89 
This developing conception of property, which had begun by the time 
of the 1913 income tax’s enactment, allowed people to divide the rights, 
duties, and power, plus the other attributes of property, among various 
people. For example, it was settled by 1938 that, with the power of 
alienation, “[a]ctually the ‘transferor’ simply destroys certain rights and 
powers in himself and creates others—not necessarily the same ones—in 
someone else.”90 Property could no longer fit within the earlier 
Blackstonian mold. 
A constraining force on this conceptual evolution in the early 
twentieth century was the relative lack of private pressure to fracture 
property interests. At the end of the nineteenth century, most forces 
pushing the definition of property interests were from the government 
through rate setting and eminent domain. In this period, there were fewer 
needs, or opportunities, for individuals to separate the bundle of property 
rights. For example, trusts were generally limited to provide for 
disadvantaged family members, to bind an estate within a family, or for 
 
85 Id. at 96–97. 
86 Grey, supra note 62, at 81. 
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charities.91 Similarly, partnerships between spouses were not recognized by 
many states until the 1920s and 1930s.92 Studies have not yet shown why 
states changed their laws at this time, whether it was solely in recognition 
of the women’s rights movement or in part to seek tax minimization.93 
Nevertheless, the opportunities for taxpayers to fracture their property grew 
in conjunction with the income tax, building on a relatively broadly 
accepted conception of property as a bundle of rights. 
Regardless of whether members of Congress accepted some, or none, 
of this conception of property, ownership for income tax purposes could 
have been based on a number of characteristics of property recognized long 
before 1913. These characteristics were more easily identified as separate 
with the fracturing of ownership and have since become sticks in the 
bundle of property rights. Legal title is an obvious element on which to 
impose the income tax. Objectively easy to measure, inequities may arise if 
those with the power and the benefit of the property can transfer legal title 
without losing those benefits. One alternate test is a control test: whoever 
controls the property that generates the income should be taxed on it. 
Although this test sounds straightforward, it could raise complicated issues 
of what “control” itself means. For example, within marriage, does the 
spouse who controls family finances own all of the family’s property? 
Another test looks to who benefits from income or the underlying property. 
This most abstract of the tests would require an analysis of benefit, after 
defining some measure of benefit. Each of these tests—focused on different 
attributes of ownership—has been used by courts at different times to 
determine ownership for income tax purposes.94 
Not everyone accepted, or accepts today, the idea of property as a 
bundle of rights. Laymen’s perception of property as akin to the 
Blackstonian ideal has likely not evolved since Bruce Ackerman noted it as 
such in 1977 or Thomas Grey in 1980.95 As for scholars, in particular over 
the last several decades, there has been a reaction against the bundle 
conception.96 One critic argued that at its extreme the bundle has “no 
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independent or essential content.”97 Scholars warn that we should not take 
the bundle imagery too seriously and that, even for those trained in the law, 
the absolutist notion of property prevails.98 Nonetheless, these critiques of 
the paradigm in the property law context risk dismissing the value of the 
bundle conception, especially with respect to taxation. One study 
completed in 2009 found that a difference in the understanding of the term 
“property” does exist and that those who view their rights to property in a 
Blackstonian way are less likely to part with their rights than those who 
accept the bundle of rights paradigm.99 Consequently, framing property as a 
bundle of rights weakens perceptions of absolute ownership. With this 
rethinking of property, taxation is more complicated in operation but is less 
likely to be resisted. 
To the extent one accepts some version of the bundle of rights, 
presumably any attribute of property, such as title, control, or benefit, 
associated in some way with the property’s income could be taxed under 
the income tax. To guide tax authorities as to which stick is appropriate for 
income taxation, the tax system should incorporate an overt definition of 
property in order for the tax to apply properly to the income “of” the 
taxpayer. This clarification is unlikely to come soon. That the old 
Blackstonian concept of property was adopted in 1913 is unfortunate 
because it allowed Congress to forego debate on this issue. The abstract 
rights since created by sophisticated contracting and financial engineering 
threaten a tax system that is built on the conception of property as a 
physical res. Back then, however, Congress was stuck in the mode of 
thinking of property as a physical thing, for which ownership was clear, 
and did not address the bundle of issues that have since become important. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE BUNDLE OF CONFUSION 
Soon after enactment of the income tax, it became clear that issues of 
ownership would have to be unraveled by the Treasury Department and the 
courts. The lack of a congressionally crafted, nuanced understanding of 
property made it difficult to decipher who should be taxed on particular 
sums of income. Families were often the locus of these early debates. 
Because of the income tax’s progressive rates, families had an economic 
incentive to have as many members as possible “own” parts of the property 
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that generated families’ livelihood. Today issues of ownership extend far 
beyond the family. As an example, in synthetic leases the IRS must 
determine whether the lessor or lessee should be treated as the owner of the 
leased property for tax purposes. Thus the Treasury Department and the 
courts parse the meaning of ownership after the fact in various economic 
arrangements. 
Initially the Supreme Court took positions on ownership that 
aggregated ownership attributes under the Blackstonian conception of 
property. The Court argued that if the taxpayer “retains for himself so many 
of the attributes of ownership,” he could not claim to be “the victim of 
despotic power when for the purpose of taxation he is treated as owner 
altogether.”100 When this theory conflicted with legal title, the Court held 
that Congress “may tax not only ownership, but any right or privilege that 
is a constituent of ownership.”101 Slowly developing a federal common law 
of ownership for federal income tax purposes, Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. led the Court to standardize the income tax treatment of 
disparate ownership forms.102 Justice Benjamin Cardozo agreed that the 
purpose for devices that fractured ownership was to make it possible “for 
the taxpayer to surrender title to another and to keep dominion for himself, 
or if not technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment.”103 
The Court was not making control or benefit a substitute for 
ownership but instead was recognizing, at least in some cases, that control 
and benefit were sticks in the bundle of property rights. On the other hand, 
they were not the only permissible sticks to tax. In Poe v. Seaborn, the 
Court found that community property law’s designation of the husband as 
manager of community property “was but a recognition of the ownership of 
another.”104 H.G. Seaborn’s salary was therefore owned one-half by his 
wife at the time it was earned. Thus, ownership for tax purposes was 
certainly more than legal title; what more had to be worked out for each 
property-dividing arrangement. 
At times the Supreme Court created rules to define ownership—as it 
did with respect to community property—that were based on specific sticks 
in the property bundle. In Lucas v. Earl, Guy Earl failed to convince the 
Court that his contract with his wife giving her one-half of his wages 
changed the ownership of the property for income tax purposes.105 
Thereafter, control over the creation of wage income has been a sufficient 
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interest for income taxation, except for those married couples governed by 
community property and Poe v. Seaborn. In Corliss v. Bowers, the Court 
held that although a revocable trust’s income accrued completely and 
irrevocably to the beneficiary, the creator of the trust could shift income 
through use of the trust without losing any control over the underlying 
property and therefore the creator of the trust should be taxed on income he 
did not legally own.106 Ownership has thus been based on many different 
attributes of property. The complexities of knowing what will trigger an 
income tax obligation continue to trouble the system. 
A. Family Partnerships 
Family partnerships have historically forced questions of who owns 
what, although the question today arises more for estate than income tax 
purposes.107 In answering this question, the IRS and the courts focus on 
whether the creation of the partnership was for tax avoidance purposes or 
for business reasons. Focusing on the purpose rather than the state law 
property interests that are created means the government has effectively 
created a federal common law of family partnership taxation. The result 
might be a political necessity. State law originally did not permit spousal 
partnerships, and when that policy changed,108 some families sought to use 
the partnership form, as they did with contracts and trusts, to reduce their 
collective taxes. One example of this perceived abuse is the use of a family 
partnership to avoid hundreds of thousands of dollars in federal income tax 
by James W. Cannon, one of the richest men in North Carolina in the 
1920s.109 Cannon’s perceived abuse drew significant public attention to the 
arrangement because his son-in-law worked for the Treasury Department, 
illustrating the tax avoidance of those connected, albeit indirectly, to the tax 
system. 
In the early decades of the federal income tax, the Treasury 
Department performed a case-by-case analysis of each partnership’s often-
murky facts and circumstances to determine whether the partnership was 
impermissibly formed for tax avoidance purposes. Consequently, cases 
involving these arrangements tended to rely very precisely on their 
particular facts.110 In one early case, Burnet v. Leininger, the Court held that 
income from a husband–wife partnership remained taxable to the 
 
106 281 U.S. 376, 377 (1930). 
107 See, e.g., Katherine D. Black et al., When a Discount Isn’t a Bargain: Debunking the Myths 
Behind Family Limited Partnerships, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 245 (2002); Wendy C. Gerzog, Erickson: A 
Primer on FLPs, 116 TAX NOTES 201 (2007). 
108 See McMahon, California Women, supra note 93. 
109 Blair as Tax Chief Blocked in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1921, at 3. 
110 Compare Knapp v. Comm’r, 5 B.T.A. 762 (1926) (holding that partnership interests were not 
vested in minor children), with Kelley v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 832 (1927) (holding that partnership 
interests were vested in children). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
978 
husband.111 Charles P. Leininger had agreed with his wife that she should 
share equally in the partnership’s profits and losses; however, the 
partnership books never reflected Mrs. Leininger’s alleged interest and she 
had not taken part in the management of the business or contributed to its 
capital.112 The Supreme Court characterized the agreement as an assignment 
of the husband’s income—using Earl as the operative analogy.113 The mere 
presence of a permissive state law and an interspousal agreement was not 
enough to give a family partnership tax effect if the Court determined that 
the partnership lacked substance. 
In their attempts to evaluate the formation of partnerships, courts 
found it difficult to apply local law consistently when examining whether 
husbands and wives, in particular, formed valid partnerships. At times 
courts were deferential to state law and at other times they were dismissive. 
In Sunlin v. Commissioner, for example, a Michigan law forbidding 
husbands and wives from forming partnerships was held to enlarge the 
rights of women, not to deprive them of property, and therefore it seemed 
incongruous to the court that wives would lose their interests in preexisting 
businesses because of their marriages.114 As a result, the wife in the case 
was held to have a valid property interest for tax purposes although she did 
not have one for state property law purposes.115 Looking at the policy of 
state law, the court ignored the letter of state law. It was, however, a step 
toward uniform application of ownership in the federal income tax system. 
This “facts and circumstances” test of ownership could be problematic 
for taxpayers because they lacked assurance that the IRS would recognize 
their partnerships as effectively shifting income. Partnerships risked having 
their favorable tax treatment denied if they were found not to convey real 
property interests under the federal test. This was a real risk; family 
partnerships were found valid in only 35% of the cases brought to test their 
income-shifting ability.116 And if a family failed to convince the 
government of the validity of its actions, the family could be liable not only 
for back taxes but also for penalties and interest covering the period it 
employed the device.117 This created uncertainty in the application of the 
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income tax. Despite this risk, couples took aggressive positions with 
partnerships in the hopes of securing lower collective income taxes.118 
To manage a growing number of family partnerships in the mid-1940s 
as tax rates rose during World War II, the Court drew more specific 
standards for when family partnerships created new property interests for 
income tax purposes. As a result of these changes, taxpayers’ ability to split 
ownership of income between family members was severely limited. In 
Commissioner v. Tower and Lusthaus v. Commissioner, the Court reiterated 
that the income from a family partnership was taxable to the partner who 
originally owned the business unless it was a bona fide partnership; that the 
partnership was valid under state law was insufficient.119 Moreover, the 
Court ruled that, although the Internal Revenue Code does not require the 
contribution of services or capital in its definition of a partner, the existence 
of one or the other was necessary for determining whether the partnership 
was bona fide.120 
This ownership test still focused on the creation of the entity under a 
national standard, rather than the property interests existing thereafter 
under state law, and in neither case did the Court look to the attributes of 
the interest the wife held. Justice Stanley Reed dissented in both Tower and 
Lusthaus, with then-Chief Justice Harlan Stone joining him, arguing that 
the Court was inexcusably ignoring state law as to what created a property 
interest.121 One commentator complained that “we may have a business 
organization which is a valid partnership by state law, and is not recognized 
as such for income tax purposes; and conversely, though not recognized by 
local law it may be a valid partnership under the Internal Revenue Code.”122 
A legitimate concern was that if the partnership was valid under state law 
and did vest an ownership interest, a taxpayer might be taxed on income 
that he did not receive, was not entitled to, and did not own.123 
 
118 See, e.g., Rossmoore v. Comm’r, 76 F.2d 520, 520–21 (2d Cir. 1935); Rossmoore v. Anderson, 
67 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) (per curiam); Mitchell v. Bowers, 9 F.2d 414, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1925). But 
see I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 3421, 7-1 C.B. 106 (1928) (finding that husband and wife “should be 
permitted to report in their separate returns the income to which they are legally entitled”). 
119 Comm’r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 287–88 (1946); Lusthaus v. Comm’r, 327 U.S. 293, 297 
(1946). 
120 Tower, 327 U.S. at 290; see also Vernon J. Veron, Taxation of the Income of Family 
Partnerships, 59 HARV. L. REV. 209, 247 (1945); cf. Johnston v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 799, 807 (1944) 
(finding the wife was a “bona fide” partner because she invested capital into the partnership). But see 
Phelps v. Comm’r, 13 B.T.A. 1248, 1250 (1928) (finding that although the “wives contributed no 
capital,” that in and of itself “does not disprove the fact that a partnership agreement was entered into”). 
121 Lusthaus, 327 U.S. at 297–304 (Reed, J., dissenting); Tower, 327 U.S. at 292 (Reed, J., 
dissenting). 
122 Yale A. Barkan, Family Partnerships Under the Income Tax, 44 MICH. L. REV. 179, 182 (1945) 
(citation omitted). 
123 See Comment, Comments on Avoidance of Family Partnership Gifts, 12 U. DET. L.J. 124, 126 
(1949). 
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Despite the Court’s tests, the Treasury Department tried to issue its 
own guidance for the income tax treatment of family partnerships.124 The 
IRS worried that “[a]ttempts to escape surtaxes by dividing one income 
into two or more incomes through the device of family partnerships present 
an acute problem in the administration of the Federal income tax.”125 As a 
result, the IRS argued the Internal Revenue Code taxed income to the 
person who earned it or created the right to receive it or who controlled its 
use.126 Even more so than the Court’s ruling, this broad definition of 
ownership would allow the Treasury Department to aggregate the income 
of property to one owner. 
Not long thereafter, the Court backtracked from its specific 
requirements of Tower and Lusthaus, but in the process the Court made it 
harder to determine ex ante when a property interest for income tax 
purposes had been created. In Commissioner v. Culbertson, an owner of a 
cattle business financed his four sons’ partnership interests in the 
business.127 The Court held that the future contribution of services could not 
vest ownership of a portion of the partnership’s property in the new 
partners. However, property interests would be created if “the parties in 
good faith and acting with a business purpose intended to join together in 
the present conduct of the enterprise.”128 As in earlier cases, the goal was to 
determine not whether there was a property interest per se but whether the 
creation of the partnership was bona fide. The fact that there was no 
contribution of original capital or the provision of vital services to the 
partnership was to be taken into consideration but was not conclusive.129 
What was necessary to create a new property interest for purposes of the 
federal income tax was less clear than before. 
When Congress mandated in 1948 that married couples filing joint 
returns artificially split their income, spouses had less economic incentive 
to divide “their income through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, and 
family partnerships.”130 Nonetheless, family partnerships remained a 
method for tax minimization because of the ability to shift income to other 
family members. In response to the continued demand for family 
partnerships, after a bill failed in 1948, Congress in 1951 introduced new 
rules for determining when property interests in family partnerships were 
created for income tax purposes.131 The principles were the same as those 
 
124 I.T. 3845, 1947-1 C.B. 66. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 337 U.S. 733, 736 (1949). 
128 Id. at 742. 
129 Id. at 741–45. 
130 S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 25 (1948). 
131 Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, sec. 340, Pub. L. No. 82-183, 65 Stat. 452, 511; see Revenue 
Revision Act of 1948, H.R. 6712, 80th Cong. (1948); see also I.R.C. § 704(e) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 
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that govern the attribution of other income, namely, “income from property 
is attributable to the owner of the property.”132 The same uncertainties also 
applied. The reports of the House Committee on Ways and Means and the 
Senate Committee on Finance both provided that the IRS and the courts 
were still 
free to inquire in any case whether the donee or purchaser [of a partnership 
interest] actually owns the interest in the partnership . . . . [C]ases will arise 
where the transferor retains so many of the incidents of ownership that he will 
continue to be recognized as a substantial owner of the interest which he 
purports to have given away . . . .133 
The new provision provided for the reallocation of income among 
partners, even if found to own a property interest in the partnership, if the 
former owner did not receive reasonable compensation for his services and 
a proportionate return for his capital.134 It is likely that lower taxpayer 
demand for family partnerships or reduced enforcement, rather than the 
inherent clarity of this new ownership standard, has quieted debate over the 
ownership of family partnership interests.135 
The issue was, and remains, what creates a property interest in a 
partnership for federal tax purposes. Focusing on the interests instead of the 
partnership’s creation, and recognizing that ownership consists of several 
rights in property, one author suggested that the income of family 
partnerships only be amalgamated if one person has the right to acquire the 
interests of the other partners at no cost.136 Control, according to this 
advocate, should not otherwise be considered as an ownership attribute 
because many partnerships delegate management to one partner.137 This 
approach is unlikely to be adopted. As with most other income-shifting 
devices, the Court worries that retention of control or enjoyment of direct 
or substantial benefits of the property “blend so imperceptibly with the 
normal concepts of full ownership” to be sufficient to direct the incidence 
of the tax.138 
 
82-586, at 32–34 (1951). The 1951 Act only applied to partnerships in which capital is a material 
income-producing factor. 
132 H.R. REP. NO. 82-586, at 32. 
133 Id. at 33; S. REP. NO. 82-781, at 39 (1951).  
134 For a discussion, see Israel Packel, The Next Inning of Family Partnerships, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 
153, 161–62 (1951). 
135 To recognize a family partnership for estate tax purposes, the Tax Court requires a substantial, 
nontax motive, plus the partnership interests must be proportionate to the value of the property the 
partner transfers to the partnership. Estate of Bongard v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 95, 118 (2005); see also 
Wendy C. Gerzog, Bongard’s Nontax Motive Test: Not Open and Schutt, 107 TAX NOTES 1711, 1711 
(2005). 
136 Veron, supra note 120, at 259–62, 266. 
137 Id. at 259. 
138 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940). 
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B. Synthetic Leases 
As in family partnerships, people work together to shape the 
determination of who owns what in synthetic leases.139 Synthetic leases that 
led, in part, to the collapse of Enron, are best known for their accounting 
treatment.140 Nonetheless, the tax consequences of synthetic leases raise 
interesting questions of ownership because taxpayers are allowed to ignore 
the form they use in these transactions. In synthetic leases, a lessee 
qualifies a lease as an operating lease for financial accounting purposes so 
that it remains off the books whereas the lease qualifies as a purchase with 
a mortgage for federal income tax purposes. The lessor, as nominal owner, 
borrows money to buy the leased property based on the lessee’s agreement 
to pay rent. The lessor then makes mortgage payments from the lessee’s 
rent. Disregarding the form of these transactions, the lessor is disregarded 
for tax purposes (although treated as the actual owner for accounting 
purposes). Based on the economic reality of the transaction, the lessee is 
treated as the tax owner of the leased property, despite not holding legal 
title. This determination of ownership allows the lessee to claim 
depreciation deductions on the property based on an amount including the 
borrowed funds. Additionally, the lessee deducts the portion of the rental 
payments attributable to interest (but not the payments traceable to the 
principal of the loan) on the lessee’s deemed property. In the early years of 
this type of arrangement, the depreciation deductions plus interest 
deductions claimed by a lessee typically exceed the forgone rental 
deduction.141 Depending upon the facts and circumstances, the IRS has 
affirmed this tax treatment.142 
This tax result is not surprising. Since the 1930s, lessees have been 
allowed to disregard a lease’s form if the transaction is, in substance, a 
purchase with a mortgage.143 In other words, depending upon the facts and 
 
139 Synthetic leases are generally short, three to five years, in which the lessor must have a 3% 
equity investment in the property in order for the lessee to enjoy the accounting rule benefits, and the 
lessee has virtually all residual risk and rewards. Steven G. Frost & Paul Carman, Federal and State 
Tax Consequences of Synthetic Leasing—Multiple Benefits, Minimal Risks, 95 J. TAX’N 361, 365 
(2001). 
140 See Cheryl D. Block, Congress and Accounting Scandals: Is the Pot Calling the Kettle Black?, 
82 NEB. L. REV. 365, 440–41, 446–47 (2003); José Gabilondo, Financial Moral Panic! Sarbanes–
Oxley, Financier Folk Devils, and Off-Balance-Sheet Arrangements, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 781, 816–
19 (2006); Daniel Austin Green, Accounting’s Nadir: Failures of Form or Substance?, 12 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 601, 645–46 (2010); Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick 
Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 57–59, 68; Neal 
Newman, Enron and the Special Purpose Entities—Use or Abuse?—The Real Problem—The Real 
Focus, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 97, 104–05, 118 (2007); Donald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: 
Structured Finance, Financial Accounting and Tax Ownership, 25 J. CORP. L. 445, 486–87 (2000). 
141 Weidner, supra note 140, at 447–48. 
142 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199920003 (Jan. 12, 1999); Rev. Proc. 2001-28, 2001-19 I.R.B. 1156, 
1156–60. 
143 Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939). 
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circumstances, a lessee may be taxed as the owner of property despite not 
having legal title.144 But the road to the favorable tax treatment of synthetic 
leases has not been easy, in part because of the complicated issues of 
ownership. The IRS and the courts consider numerous factors when 
deciding who has the “significant and genuine attributes” of ownership for 
tax purposes.145 The “substance of a transaction, rather than its legal form, 
is controlling,” with the question being who “has all the burdens and 
benefits of ownership.”146 The IRS compiled a list of factors based on 
several Tax Court cases that should be analyzed when evaluating a 
synthetic lease.147 No one factor is dispositive; therefore, a factor-by-factor 
analysis is necessary. As with family partnerships, the IRS focuses more on 
whether the transaction is abusive than whether taxpayers have legitimate 
ownership interests.148 
The IRS has not always looked at the substance of the lease 
arrangement in these transactions when determining ownership, and the 
prior position created inequitable results. In Bolger v. Commissioner, a 
commercial user of real estate was able to lease property with the payment 
to the financier (in addition to the payment of the property’s mortgage) 
being the entitlement to the building’s tax depreciation deductions instead 
of a cash payment.149 The IRS conceded the form of the transaction.150 The 
Tax Court expressed frustration that the IRS failed to argue that the 
transaction was a mortgage by the lessee.151 Because the IRS never argued 
that the lessee was the owner–mortgagor, and hence the proper party to 
report the depreciation deductions, the depreciation deductions were 
stripped from the true owner–borrower and assigned first to the financing 
corporation, which in turn assigned them to the financier.152 
The IRS now generally accepts that the lessee is the owner of synthetic 
leases but this requires a complex weighing of the facts. In Sun Oil Co. v. 
Commissioner, the question was whether the lessee could deduct the “rent” 
it paid when the tax-exempt status of the lessor precluded an offsetting 
inclusion in income.153 The IRS argued that the lessee retained an equity 
interest in the property and therefore could not obtain a Section 162(a) 
deduction for the rental “of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or 
 
144 Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41. 
145 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 584 (1978). 
146 Rev. Rul. 72-543, 1972-2 C.B. 87, 88. 
147 See Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39, 41–42. 
148 Id. 
149 59 T.C. 760, 762–63 (1973). 
150 Id. at 761. 
151 Id. at 767 n.5, 769 n.8. 
152 Id. at 767–68. 
153 562 F.2d 258, 259 (3d Cir. 1977). 
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is not taking title or in which he has no equity.”154 Because the lessee 
retained all the benefits and burdens of ownership, the lessee could deduct 
only the portion of the “rent” that was traceable to a payment of interest 
and not the portion attributable to the repayment of principal.155 The Third 
Circuit accepted that the benefits and burdens of ownership could be 
allocated any number of ways between a landlord and a tenant of 
commercial real estate: “The usual business bargain between a commercial 
lessor and lessee is far more complex. Real estate interests between a lessor 
and lessee normally are divided into a number of parts, each of which 
represents an ownership interest in property.”156 
Because of this complex weighing of facts, the IRS has at times lost 
the ownership classification, resulting in the taxpayer winning an unjust 
income tax reduction. In Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, a bank entered 
into a sale–leaseback of a building with the Frank Lyon Company, a 
closely held corporation whose majority shareholder and board chair was 
also a member of the bank’s board.157 The bank “sold” the building as it 
was constructed to the Lyon Company and “leased” the building back, also 
receiving a number of options to repurchase the building.158 The bank, as 
lessee, was obligated for rent and to pay all maintenance, repairs, taxes, and 
insurance on the building.159 In addition, the bank’s obligation to pay net 
rent was absolute and unconditional, even in the event of destruction of the 
building.160 The bank could repurchase the building at any time by 
prepaying the mortgage with accrued interest.161 Consistent with its formal 
ownership of the building, the Lyon Company reported depreciation 
deductions on its cost.162 
The IRS took the position that the lease and options made the bank the 
owner of the building such that the bank, rather than the Lyon Company, 
was entitled to its depreciation deductions.163 The Eighth Circuit agreed.164 
The Eighth Circuit held that ownership was a “bundle of sticks” and that 
the Lyon Company “totes an empty bundle and that the term ‘owner’ for 
tax purposes cannot reasonably be attached to the empty wrapping taxpayer 
has retained.”165 The Lyon Company’s only economic advantage for its 
 
154 Id. at 259 n.1. 
155 Id. at 269. 
156 Id. at 262. 
157 435 U.S. 561, 563, 565 (1978). 
158 Id. at 566–67. 
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160 See id. at 570–71. 
161 Id. at 561. 
162 Id. at 568. 
163 Id. at 568–69. 
164 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 536 F.2d 746, 747 (8th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). 
165 Id. at 751. 
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“ownership” was the income tax advantages it claimed from the 
depreciation deductions in the early years of the lease.166 
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit.167 The Court 
concluded that none of the parties owned the building in any simple sense 
and, therefore, as long as the lessor retained significant attributes of a 
traditional lessor status the parties could allocate depreciation deductions 
within reasonable limits.168 The Court’s summary of the facts focused on 
the Lyon Company’s risk: the Lyon Company, not the bank, was liable for 
the note, and the Lyon Company was not even assured of a return of its 
money plus interest.169 “This possibility brings into sharp focus the fact that 
Lyon [Company], in a very practical sense, is at least the ultimate owner of 
the building.”170 However, the Lyon Company was not a traditional owner–
lessor. The bank controlled the use of the building, and the structure of its 
options to purchase the building captured all of its potential appreciation in 
value unless the new building was condemned prior to the date of the 
bank’s first repurchase option.171 In addition to having the benefits of 
ownership, the bank also bore the burden of the building’s operating costs 
and an unconditional promise to pay rent.172 The Court did not consider 
these attributes of ownership persuasive.173 
C. Broader Implications 
The consequences of applying complex and undefined tests to 
determine ownership and property for the application of the federal income 
tax extend beyond the revenue raised or foregone. One consequence is 
pressure applied to change interpretations of state property law. For 
example, with respect to family partnerships, failure to secure favorable tax 
results caused some families to invalidate state law property interests. In 
Stone v. Stone, Michigan courts allowed a husband and wife to set aside 
gifts of partnership interests to their eleven-year-old children when the 
federal tax savings did not materialize.174 According to the court, “The 
consequences of requiring the father to pay the income tax on the entire 
income of a partnership in the earnings of which he has but a one quarter 
 
166 Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 571–72. 
167 Id. at 584. 
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169 Id. at 566–68. 
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interest can readily be imagined.”175 Thus, the federal income tax has 
altered the application of property law in the states.176 Notwithstanding this 
risk, no single model of “ownership” has been crafted that applies for tax 
purposes, and determining who is the appropriate owner of a given piece of 
income-producing property often remains a “close call.”177 A consequence 
of this is that for taxpayers and the IRS, determining ex ante if a particular 
attribute of ownership is sufficient to produce taxable income is confusing, 
at best. This confusion may confound taxpayers’ ability to plan for other, 
non-tax-related matters. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress has not grappled with what it means to own something for 
federal income tax purposes even though the conception of property as a 
bundle of rights gained traction as the new tax developed. Congress failed 
to anticipate that the bundle of rights concept would result in the 
proliferation of property interests in income-producing assets. As a result, 
taxpayers can use the existence of myriad property interests in the same 
taxable item to minimize their income taxes. The result has been 
problematic for the tax. In response to these problems, Congress could 
adopt a definition of ownership that would override state law issues and 
clarify what ownership attributes are sufficient to trigger the tax. However, 
it would be difficult (and politically unlikely) for congressional action to 
override the different conceptions of what property is. In the face of likely 
inaction on this issue, policymakers need to be aware of the complications 
for income tax purposes inherent in the idea of ownership and property. 
There are consequences to not basing taxation on a well-thought-out 
and consistent definition of ownership. First, what happens if two people 
should be subject to tax on the same income or if the person subject to tax 
on a given amount of income is unable to access the income to pay the 
taxes owed? The Treasury Department once declared, “[T]he Internal 
Revenue Code taxes income to the person who earns it, or who creates the 
right to receive it, or who controls its use.”178 This could be many people at 
the same time. Consider Helvering v. Clifford, when a husband created a 
trust to pay the income earned on securities to his wife, but the husband 
retained the right to change the trust’s terms. The Court held that the 
husband was the owner of the corpus.179 However, if the wife had an 
ownership interest under state law, arguably she should be taxed on the 
trust’s income, as was her husband under the Court’s decision. Moreover, 
she might not be legally obligated to provide him the revenue to pay the 
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taxes he owed on her income. Thus the trust’s income is “of” both spouses 
for income tax purposes but not necessarily any other purpose. This 
multiple taxation has occurred in the past. As noted in 1921, the 
government taxed two people on the same income earned from a trust 
because the rules were not based on a singular view of property or 
ownership.180 
To the extent that we adopt a more nuanced view of ownership for tax 
purposes, it is possible that other issues for the income tax, such as tax 
shelters, could be more easily addressed. Using a settled definition of who 
really owns and should be taxed on income generated by property may be 
less convoluted than trying to undo or negate transactions. Additionally, 
employing a real sense of ownership for the imposition of the income tax 
would allow taxpayers to be taxed more accurately according to their 
ability to pay taxes. Ownership of any type of property rights carries with it 
other benefits, such as increased political and social power, that may have 
far-ranging effects beyond the piece of property itself. These other 
privileges cannot be taxed directly under the current system, or indirectly 
by taxing the property interest that gives rise to that power, if the interest is 
held to be owned by someone else. Linking ownership to the correct person 
best provides the government the tools to tax everyone according to their 
real ability to pay. 
Developing a theory of ownership for tax purposes is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Therefore, this inquiry may raise more questions than 
it answers. Does property for tax purposes have to be the same as for other 
purposes? If property must have a limited number of standard forms, if 
only to reduce the transaction costs of knowing who owns what property, 
do those limits apply in the world of tax? If so, is the objective to limit the 
cost to the government of ascertaining who owns what, and is that a fair 
limitation on property? These questions need to be answered if we want to 
operate in a world where the federal income tax applies correctly to the 
income of an individual. 
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